Truce vs. Detente vs. Victory

Instapundit quotes the following from blogger Jon Henke:

One year ago, Al Qaeda believed they should work against the United States, rather than working to destabilize the Arab regimes. One year ago, Al Qaeda was focusing outward, rather than inward. One year ago, Al Qaeda believed in coexistence with the House of Saud.

One year ago, Al Qaeda believed the Caliphate could best be established by detente with the House of Saud, and War against the United States.

Today, Al Qaeda seeks detente with the US, and war against the House of Saud.

Henke cites some very interesting material about Islamist goals, but he uses the term “détente” improperly. Détente refers to a situation where two, potentially mortal rivals agree to acknowledge the permanence of each other, and work together to reduce the negative consequences of confrontation. Neither side has accepted the permanence of the other in this conflict.

What Henke describes is closer to a truce, where two mortal rivals simply agree to stop shooting at each other right now, and put off how to deal with one another until later. (North Korea and South Korea, for example, have been putting things off for over 50 years). But I don’t think the statements quoted by Henke qualify as even that. Instead, they reflect a strategic and/or tactical decision about where to apply resources against the enemy, e.g. the fact that Japan did not directly attack Great Britain during WWII did not imply any sort of truce existed between Japan and the UK.

These are not pedantic differences. They go to the heart of Peter Beinart’s challenge to the American left. To avoid alienating anyone in their political base, the Dems have been unclear about whether they seek détente, truce, or victory in the war on Islamist terror. Beinart’s challenge is a call for the left to clearly come out in favor of victory, and reject truce or détente.